Date: 7 October 2026 Publication Type: Research Project: MaMeeFarm™
Abstract
Supply-chain crises are often described through visible events.
A port closes.
A factory stops.
A shipping route is disrupted.
A strike interrupts transport.
A conflict reduces supply.
Then the event passes.
The port reopens.
The factory restarts.
Ships begin moving again.
The visible crisis appears to end.
But supply-chain fragility can persist long after the immediate disruption has eased.
Inventories may remain depleted.
Backlogs may still need to be cleared.
Transport routes may operate at higher cost.
Production capacity may remain misaligned with demand.
Emergency suppliers may be expensive or less scalable.
Working capital may remain under pressure.
Replacement parts may still have long lead times.
And the system may have consumed much of the spare capacity that allowed it to survive the first shock.
Current evidence illustrates this persistence. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Global Supply Chain Pressure Index increased from 1.20 in August 2026 to 1.28 in September. The increase does not identify one cause, and the index remained below its May 2026 level of 1.81. But it demonstrates that broader supply-chain pressure can increase again after earlier stress has eased.
This research examines why supply chains can regain flow before they regain resilience.
Its central finding is that post-crisis recovery has several distinct dimensions:
- flow;
- inventory;
- capacity;
- cost;
- network structure; and
- response capability.
These dimensions do not necessarily recover at the same speed.
A supply chain may therefore appear operational while remaining unusually vulnerable to the next shock.
1. Research Question
Why can supply chains remain fragile after the immediate disruption has passed, and how do depleted inventories, transport constraints, production mismatches, elevated costs, substitution, and reduced response capacity preserve vulnerability after visible flows begin to normalize?
2. The End of the Crisis Is Not the End of the Stress
A crisis is often defined by its most visible disruption.
A facility closes.
A route becomes unavailable.
Production stops.
A border is restricted.
But the supply chain does not return instantly to its previous condition when that event ends.
The system still contains consequences of the interruption.
Orders remain delayed.
Inventories remain lower.
Alternative suppliers may still be in use.
Transport networks may remain distorted.
Contracts may still reflect crisis pricing.
Production schedules may remain out of alignment.
The physical event can therefore end before the operational consequences disappear.
3. Supply Chains Have Memory
A supply chain carries the effects of previous disruptions forward through time.
This memory can remain visible in:
- backlogs;
- inventory levels;
- supplier commitments;
- production schedules;
- transport queues;
- maintenance needs;
- unfilled orders; and
- working-capital requirements.
Historical and current evidence shows that disruptions can continue affecting delivery times, shortages, inventories, costs, and financing after activity begins to recover.
The important principle is:
Current flow reflects both present capacity and unresolved effects from the past.
4. Flow Recovery Is the Most Visible Form of Recovery
The first sign of recovery is often that goods begin moving again.
Factories restart.
Ships sail.
Trucks move.
Ports reopen.
Orders begin to be fulfilled.
This is important.
But functioning flow does not reveal:
- how much inventory was consumed;
- how much spare capacity remains;
- whether costs have normalized;
- whether alternative suppliers are temporary; or
- how well the system could absorb another disruption.
Flow is therefore evidence of operational recovery in one dimension.
It is not complete evidence of restored resilience.
5. Inventory Can Hide Fragility
Inventories are buffers between production and demand.
They allow one part of the supply chain to continue operating when another part is temporarily disrupted.
During a crisis, inventories may be used to preserve continuity.
This makes the system appear more stable.
But each unit withdrawn reduces the remaining buffer.
The supply chain can therefore maintain deliveries while becoming more fragile underneath.
6. Flow Restored Does Not Mean Buffer Restored
Suppose a company normally holds 100 units of safety stock.
During a disruption, inventory falls to 20.
Supply later resumes.
Customers begin receiving goods again.
From a flow perspective, conditions have improved substantially.
But the company still has only 20 units of reserve.
A second disruption would therefore be harder to absorb.
This creates an important distinction:
Flow recovery means goods are moving again.
Buffer recovery means protective inventories and other reserves have been rebuilt.
The two can occur at different times.
7. Energy Markets Provide a Contemporary Example
The 2026 oil market illustrates this mechanism.
Industry executives reported in October that oil and fuel supply buffers available to the global market had become significantly depleted during prolonged disruption.
Improving physical flows therefore did not immediately imply restored inventory protection.
The lesson extends beyond energy.
A system can appear operational precisely because it consumed resources designed to protect it during stress.
8. Inventory Rebuilding Can Compete With Current Demand
After a disruption, production may need to serve two objectives:
- current customers; and
- inventory replenishment.
If capacity is limited, these objectives compete.
A company may choose to restore safety stock slowly to avoid disrupting current deliveries.
Inventories can therefore remain below previous levels for an extended period even after production resumes.
The supply chain remains exposed during the rebuilding period.
9. Backlogs Extend the Crisis Through Time
Orders delayed during the disruption do not disappear.
They become backlog.
Once production resumes, the system may need to serve both:
- new demand; and
- delayed demand from earlier periods.
This can create unusually high utilization.
Factories may operate near capacity.
Transport networks may remain congested.
Customers may continue experiencing long delivery times.
The original event may have ended.
Its backlog can continue shaping operations.
10. Lead Times Carry Historical Stress
Lead time is the time between initiating a requirement and receiving the required output.
During disruptions, lead times often rise.
When the immediate disruption ends, they do not necessarily return immediately.
Suppliers may still have:
- unfilled orders;
- production queues;
- labor constraints;
- material shortages; or
- transport delays.
The supply chain can therefore retain evidence of earlier stress even while new disruption declines.
This can be described as lead-time memory.
11. Production Restart Is Not Full Capacity Recovery
A factory can restart without returning to previous capacity.
It may still face:
- equipment damage;
- maintenance backlog;
- labor shortages;
- input shortages;
- reduced shifts; or
- quality problems.
Therefore:
factory operating
does not necessarily mean
factory operating normally.
Reduced upstream capacity can continue generating delays elsewhere in the network.
12. Capacity Mismatch Can Persist After Demand Changes
Supply chains are built around expected demand.
A crisis can alter both supply and demand.
If demand falls sharply and later rebounds, production capacity may not recover at the same speed.
If companies reduce capacity during a downturn, the rebound can produce shortages.
If companies expand aggressively during a crisis, later normalization can produce excess capacity.
Fragility can therefore emerge from misalignment, not simply scarcity.
13. Transport Systems Also Recover Unevenly
A shipping route may reopen.
But normal transport conditions may not return immediately.
Carriers may still use:
- longer routes;
- expensive charters;
- additional handling;
- premium freight; or
- temporary scheduling arrangements.
In October 2026, Reuters reported that European shipping and forwarding companies were still operating amid elevated freight conditions associated with continuing supply-chain disruption and resilient demand.
This supports an important distinction:
route availability is not the same as transport normalization.
14. Freight Cost Can Remain Elevated After Physical Flow Returns
Transport prices reflect multiple conditions, including:
- capacity;
- fuel;
- risk;
- congestion;
- equipment availability; and
- demand.
If a physical route becomes available while transport capacity remains tight, freight can remain expensive.
Companies may therefore regain access to goods while continuing to face abnormal logistics costs.
Cost recovery is a separate dimension from physical availability.
15. Availability Recovery and Cost Recovery Can Diverge
A component may become available again.
But its price may remain substantially above previous levels.
A shipping lane may operate.
But freight rates may remain elevated.
A supplier may accept orders.
But minimum quantities may increase.
The supply chain can therefore regain physical availability before economic conditions normalize.
16. High Cost Can Change Production Decisions
Persistent cost pressure can affect:
- order size;
- supplier selection;
- inventory policy;
- production location;
- investment; and
- product pricing.
Federal Reserve research has also shown that supply-chain exposure can interact with credit demand, loan utilization, and financing conditions.
The consequences of disruption can therefore continue through financial channels even after physical shortages begin to ease.
17. Substitution Helps Restore Flow
During a disruption, companies often substitute.
They may choose:
- a new supplier;
- a different transport route;
- another material;
- a different port; or
- another logistics provider.
Substitution is an important resilience mechanism.
It can prevent complete production stoppage.
But it can also alter the structure of the supply chain.
18. Functional Recovery Is Not Structural Recovery
Suppose a company loses its primary supplier.
It finds an emergency supplier farther away.
Production resumes.
The company has achieved functional recovery.
But the new supplier may have:
- higher cost;
- longer lead time;
- lower capacity;
- different quality; or
- weaker reliability.
The supply chain works.
Its structure may nevertheless differ materially from its previous condition.
19. Alternative Suppliers Can Create New Dependencies
Diversification can improve resilience.
But emergency substitution does not automatically increase diversification.
A company may lose several suppliers and become heavily dependent on one remaining alternative.
Multiple buyers may also move toward the same substitute supplier simultaneously.
The substitute can then become a new concentration point.
One vulnerability may be replaced by another.
20. Longer Routes Can Restore Supply While Increasing Exposure
A blocked route can sometimes be bypassed.
But the replacement route may require:
- more time;
- more fuel;
- more ships;
- higher insurance; or
- additional handling.
The system restores function by consuming additional logistical resources.
This represents adaptation rather than automatic return to the previous operating condition.
21. Adaptation Can Conceal Structural Weakness
A supply chain may continue working because firms take extraordinary actions.
Examples include:
- air freight instead of ocean freight;
- overtime;
- expedited shipping;
- temporary suppliers;
- manual processing;
- heavier inventory use; or
- emergency financing.
These interventions preserve output.
But they can make the system appear more normal than the underlying operating conditions actually are.
22. Crisis Measures Can Become Hidden Operating Costs
Temporary responses may continue for months.
A company may still be:
- paying premium freight;
- holding additional inventory;
- running additional shifts;
- using redundant suppliers; or
- carrying additional working capital.
If research examines only whether deliveries occur, these burdens disappear from view.
Recovery should therefore consider the resources required to sustain restored flow.
23. Spare Capacity Can Be Consumed
Supply chains survive disruptions partly because they contain slack.
Slack can include:
- extra inventory;
- unused machine capacity;
- alternative transport;
- backup suppliers;
- additional labor; and
- financial reserves.
A crisis activates some of this capacity.
But using it reduces what remains available for another disruption.
This creates an important source of post-crisis vulnerability.
24. Response Capacity Can Decline After Successful Adaptation
A company may survive the first shock by using:
- backup inventory;
- emergency suppliers;
- overtime; and
- additional credit.
The first disruption is managed successfully.
But if another disruption occurs shortly afterward, fewer options may remain.
The system can therefore be:
operational
while having
lower response capacity.
25. Resilience Concerns the Ability to Face Another Shock
Current flow alone cannot establish resilience.
Relevant questions also include:
- How much inventory remains?
- How much spare capacity exists?
- How many realistic supplier alternatives remain?
- How quickly can transport be rerouted?
- How much financial flexibility remains?
- How quickly can operations adapt?
Resilience therefore concerns not only present operation but the remaining ability to respond to future disruption.
26. Response Time Is a Critical Variable
Two supply chains may both recover.
One takes two days.
Another takes two months.
Those outcomes are not equivalent.
Response time can reveal how quickly a system can:
- identify disruption;
- find alternatives;
- reconfigure operations;
- restore flow; and
- rebuild capacity.
Time is therefore an important dimension of resilience.
27. A Supply Chain Can Become Slower Without Stopping
Fragility does not always appear as complete failure.
The system may continue functioning but become slower.
Examples include:
- longer order-to-delivery time;
- slower customs clearance;
- slower production scheduling;
- slower supplier replacement; or
- longer equipment repair.
These changes can accumulate without producing one dramatic crisis event.
28. Small Delays Can Propagate Across Networks
Supply chains contain dependencies.
One delayed component can delay assembly.
Assembly delay can delay distribution.
Distribution delay can affect retailer inventory.
Retail inventory shortages can change ordering patterns.
The original disruption can therefore propagate through several parts of the network.
By the time downstream effects become visible, the initiating event may already have ended.
29. Supply Chains Recover Asynchronously
Different parts of a supply chain do not necessarily recover simultaneously.
A supplier may restart before downstream inventory is rebuilt.
A factory may receive materials before transport backlogs clear.
Retail availability may improve while safety stocks remain depleted.
The complete recovery period can therefore last substantially longer than the original disruption.
There is no requirement that these changes occur in one fixed order.
30. One Segment Can Appear Recovered While Another Remains Weak
A manufacturer may report normal production.
Its distributor may still have low inventory.
Ports may operate normally while inland transport remains congested.
Retail shelves may appear full while supplier lead times remain long.
System-level analysis should therefore avoid treating recovery in one segment as evidence that the entire chain has normalized.
31. Recovery Can Be Geographically Uneven
One region may rebuild quickly.
Another may remain constrained.
Alternative routes can redirect supply away from some markets.
Large buyers may secure supply faster than smaller buyers.
National or global statistics can therefore conceal local fragility.
Recovery has both network-wide and location-specific dimensions.
32. Large Firms and Small Firms May Experience Recovery Differently
Larger firms may have:
- multiple suppliers;
- stronger financing;
- larger inventories;
- greater negotiating power; and
- access to premium logistics.
Smaller firms may have fewer alternatives.
The same external shock can therefore produce different recovery trajectories across companies.
System-level improvement does not guarantee equal resilience across participants.
33. Financial Capacity Is Part of Supply-Chain Resilience
Replacing normal operations with emergency arrangements can require cash.
Companies may need to:
- buy more inventory;
- pay suppliers earlier;
- use faster transport; or
- finance longer lead times.
Working capital can therefore become a constraint.
Physical supply may exist while financially constrained firms remain unable to access it effectively.
34. Credit Conditions Can Extend Supply Problems
Supply-chain disruption can interact with financing.
Federal Reserve research published in January 2026 found that banks with greater exposure to borrowers facing supply-chain risk showed different lending patterns during periods of heightened trade-policy uncertainty.
The research also found higher loan utilization and higher spreads at more-exposed banks around the 2025 tariff announcements, patterns consistent with stronger borrower demand for financing including inventory accumulation and equipment investment.
This supports a broader point:
physical disruption and financial capacity can interact during adaptation and recovery.
It does not establish that supply-chain disruption always causes credit tightening or that the same relationship applies equally across all periods.
35. Prices Preserve Information About Stress
Prices are not a complete measure of supply-chain condition.
But persistent premiums can indicate that some forms of capacity remain tight.
Examples include:
- freight premiums;
- expedited shipping costs;
- scarce-component prices;
- insurance; and
- inventory carrying costs.
A physical shortage may ease while some of these costs remain elevated.
36. Lower Price Pressure Does Not Automatically Mean Resilience
The reverse also requires caution.
Prices can fall because demand weakens.
This can reduce market pressure without increasing physical capacity.
Therefore:
price normalization
does not necessarily mean
capacity normalization.
The underlying mechanism still matters.
37. The Global Supply Chain Pressure Index Is a System Signal
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Global Supply Chain Pressure Index combines transportation-cost and manufacturing indicators to monitor global supply-chain conditions.
In September 2026, the index increased to 1.28 from an upwardly revised 1.20 in August.
It remained below its recent May level of 1.81 and far below the pandemic-era peak.
The September change provides evidence that broader supply-chain pressure increased during the month.
It does not identify one specific cause.
38. Index Movement Should Not Be Overinterpreted
An index compresses many conditions into one signal.
A higher value does not establish:
- which industry caused the increase;
- which disruption was responsible; or
- where fragility is concentrated.
It indicates broader pressure.
Detailed explanation requires additional evidence.
This distinction becomes particularly important when several disruptions occur simultaneously.
39. Lower Pressure Than Peak Is Not the Same as Normal Resilience
Supply-chain pressure can decline substantially from a crisis peak.
But underlying systems may still contain:
- low inventories;
- high financing burdens;
- long lead times;
- temporary suppliers; or
- reduced spare capacity.
A decline in an aggregate pressure indicator is evidence of improvement in that indicator.
It is not complete evidence of structural normalization.
40. Repeated Shocks Can Create Cumulative Fragility
A supply chain does not always recover fully before the next shock.
Another disruption can arrive during:
- inventory rebuilding;
- capacity restoration;
- supplier transition; or
- financial recovery.
The new shock therefore reaches a system with less margin than before.
This can create cumulative fragility.
41. Shock Sequence Matters
Consider three disruptions.
Shock A reduces inventory.
Before inventory recovers, Shock B restricts transport.
Before transport normalizes, Shock C increases input prices.
None needs to be catastrophic in isolation.
Together they can produce severe stress because each affects a system whose adaptive capacity has already been reduced.
Supply-chain history therefore matters.
42. Fragility Can Be Hidden by Normal Output
A company may continue producing the same volume.
But underneath that output:
- inventory may be lower;
- supplier concentration may be higher;
- overtime may be greater;
- freight cost may be higher; and
- lead times may be longer.
Stable output therefore does not establish stable resilience.
This supports a broader production principle:
final output can remain unchanged while the system supporting it becomes more fragile.
43. Fragility Can Accumulate Without a Crisis Headline
Some supply-chain deterioration occurs gradually.
Lead times lengthen.
Inventories shrink.
Supplier diversity declines.
Transport costs rise.
Spare capacity disappears.
Each change may appear manageable.
Together they can reduce the ability of the system to withstand disruption.
Fragility can therefore develop without one dramatic event.
44. Headline Crisis and Operating Reality Follow Different Time Scales
News coverage often moves on when:
- a port reopens;
- a strike ends;
- a route resumes;
- a ceasefire begins; or
- production restarts.
Operational recovery can continue afterward.
Businesses may still need to clear:
- backlogs;
- inventory deficits;
- contract changes;
- supplier transitions; and
- transport imbalances.
The operating consequences of a crisis can therefore last longer than the headline event itself.
45. Recovery Has a Tail
The extended post-crisis period can be described as a recovery tail.
During this period:
- flow may improve;
- costs may remain high;
- inventories may remain low;
- lead times may remain long; and
- resilience may remain incomplete.
The supply chain may no longer be in acute crisis.
It may still be some distance from structural normalization.
46. Dimensions of Post-Crisis Recovery
Post-crisis supply-chain recovery can be examined across several distinct dimensions.
Flow Recovery
Goods and materials are moving again.
Inventory Recovery
Safety stocks and working inventories have been rebuilt.
Capacity Recovery
Production, transport, and logistics regain sufficient operating and spare capacity.
Cost Recovery
Freight, input, financing, and emergency operating costs move away from crisis conditions.
Network Recovery
Supplier options, route alternatives, and other structural choices become more robust.
Response Recovery
The system regains sufficient capability to absorb and adapt to another disruption.
These dimensions overlap and can influence one another.
They are not a mandatory recovery sequence.
Different industries, firms, routes, and disruptions can recover in different patterns and at different speeds.
47. Crisis Recovery and Resilience Recovery Are Different
A crisis can be operationally contained when immediate failure stops.
Resilience recovery requires more.
The system may need to regain sufficient:
- inventory;
- capacity;
- alternatives;
- capital; and
- response capability
to tolerate another disruption without relying on disproportionate emergency measures.
This can take considerably longer than restoring basic flow.
48. Research Considerations for Post-Crisis Supply-Chain Resilience
Several distinctions are important when interpreting post-crisis conditions.
Restored flow should remain distinct from restored resilience.
Goods moving again establish operational improvement. They do not establish that buffers and adaptive capacity have been rebuilt.
Inventory levels affect the meaning of current continuity.
Deliveries sustained by inventory drawdown can coexist with declining protection against another shock.
Backlogs can preserve earlier disruption.
Current production may be serving both present demand and unresolved orders from earlier periods.
Operating status should remain distinct from available capacity.
A factory, port, supplier, or transport route can be operating while still functioning below previous capability.
Availability and cost can recover differently.
Goods or transport services can become physically available while remaining unusually expensive.
Substitution can restore function while changing network structure.
Alternative suppliers and routes can reduce immediate disruption without necessarily restoring previous cost, capacity, diversity, or reliability.
Emergency adaptation can consume future response capability.
Inventory, credit, overtime, premium logistics, and backup suppliers used during one disruption may be less available during the next.
Financial capacity can affect physical adaptation.
A technically available alternative may remain inaccessible to a firm that cannot finance inventory, premium transport, or longer working-capital cycles.
Aggregate indicators and local conditions should remain distinct.
A global pressure index can improve while particular industries, regions, or firms remain constrained.
Stable output does not establish stable underlying resilience.
Output can be preserved through additional resources or extraordinary intervention.
Repeated shocks can interact.
A later disruption can affect a system whose inventories, finances, or alternatives have not recovered from an earlier event.
These considerations do not constitute a universal procedure for evaluating supply-chain recovery.
They identify common evidence distinctions needed when assessing whether apparent operational recovery also represents restored resilience.
49. What Current Evidence Can Establish
Current evidence supports several observations.
The New York Fed’s Global Supply Chain Pressure Index increased in September 2026 relative to August, while remaining below its May level and far below pandemic-era extremes.
Federal Reserve research shows that supply-chain exposure can interact with business financing, inventory investment, credit utilization, and loan pricing.
Current energy-market evidence shows that important oil and fuel buffers can remain depleted even while some physical flows improve.
Current transport evidence shows that elevated freight conditions can persist amid continuing disruption and resilient demand.
Together, these observations support the narrower conclusion that visible operational improvement does not necessarily establish complete structural recovery.
50. What Current Evidence Does Not Establish
The available evidence does not establish that:
- the September increase in the Global Supply Chain Pressure Index was caused by one specific crisis;
- every supply chain remains fragile after every disruption;
- high freight prices necessarily indicate physical shortage;
- supplier substitution always reduces resilience;
- lower inventories always produce immediate failure;
- financial pressure affects every firm equally; or
- stable output proves that supply-chain conditions are normal.
Those claims require more specific evidence.
51. Research Implications
Supply-chain resilience should not be measured only by whether goods are currently moving.
A system can preserve flow by consuming:
- inventory;
- spare capacity;
- capital;
- supplier alternatives; and
- logistical flexibility.
The visible result may be successful delivery.
The less visible result may be reduced protection against another disruption.
This changes the post-crisis research question.
It is not only:
Has supply resumed?
It is also:
What resources are supporting today’s supply, and how much adaptive capacity remains available if another disruption occurs?
52. Research Limitations
Supply chains vary substantially across industries.
Inventory strategies differ.
Products have different shelf lives.
Some sectors can substitute suppliers relatively easily.
Others require lengthy qualification processes.
Transport dependence differs.
Financial structures differ.
Aggregate supply-chain indexes combine many conditions and cannot identify detailed local mechanisms by themselves.
Commercial information about inventories, supplier concentration, spare capacity, contractual conditions, and emergency operating costs is also frequently incomplete.
Current energy and transport cases illustrate particular forms of post-disruption stress but should not be assumed to represent every supply chain.
For these reasons, no single indicator can fully establish post-crisis resilience.
The research value lies in distinguishing dimensions of recovery that may otherwise be hidden by the return of visible flow.
53. Research Conclusion
The end of an immediate crisis does not necessarily mark the end of supply-chain vulnerability.
A port can reopen while backlogs remain.
A factory can restart while capacity remains constrained.
Goods can move while inventories remain depleted.
Alternative suppliers can preserve production while introducing higher costs, longer routes, or new dependencies.
Customers can continue receiving products because companies are consuming resources that also protect them against future shocks.
This creates an important distinction between visible recovery and resilience recovery.
The central research principle is:
A supply chain is not resilient merely because goods are moving. It is resilient when it can absorb a new disruption without requiring disproportionate emergency adaptation.
Current flow therefore tells only part of the story.
Inventory matters.
Spare capacity matters.
Route alternatives matter.
Supplier options matter.
Financial flexibility matters.
Response speed matters.
The September 2026 increase in the New York Fed’s Global Supply Chain Pressure Index provides a contemporary indication that broader supply-chain pressure can increase even after earlier peaks have passed.
But the larger finding is not about one monthly index.
It concerns the uneven nature of recovery.
Flow may improve while inventories remain depleted.
Physical availability may improve while costs remain elevated.
Alternative routes may restore movement while consuming more logistical resources.
Production can normalize while suppliers remain concentrated.
A company can maintain output while relying on overtime, premium freight, additional credit, or reduced safety stock.
And the ability to withstand another disruption may remain weaker than the current flow suggests.
The period after an immediate crisis is therefore not simply a transition from disruption to normality.
It can contain a prolonged recovery tail in which different parts of the supply chain recover at different speeds.
For businesses and researchers, the most important post-crisis question is consequently not only:
Is the supply chain working again?
It is:
How much hidden fragility remains inside the system that is making today’s flow possible?
References
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Global Supply Chain Pressure Index.
Morgan, L., Ramírez, C. A., Silva, A. F., & Zlate, A. (2026). Supply Chain Risk and Bank Lending Amid Trade Policy Uncertainty. FEDS Notes. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. DOI: 10.17016/2380-7172.3996.
Reuters. (2026, October 6). New York Fed says supply chain pressures rose last month relative to August.
Reuters. (2026, October 6). Oil, fuel supply buffers are thinning as Middle East conflict continues, Chevron CEO says.
Reuters. (2026, October 6). European shippers, forwarders to deliver strong Q3 on resilient demand for pricey freight.
Reuters. (2026, October 5). Oil market turmoil could last for years, executives say.